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Since 1983, the banking industry has gone through some very
troubled times. It started with the British and the Chinese
Governments'-discussion about the future of Hong Kong. Public
panic caused by political uncertainty brought turbulence to the
local economy. Most people were scrambling for cash or other forms
of liquid assets in order to take refuge overseas.
It was at this period that a series of local banks ran into
trouble. The first was the Hang Lung Bank, then the Overseas Trust
Bank, followed by the Ka Wah Bank, the Wing On Bank and most recently
the Union Bank. The occurrence of these events was not incidental.
As a result, the existing Banking Ordinance was severely critized for
its insufficiency, deficiency and outdatedness, making it very
difficult to cope with the rapidly changing banking community.
The Hong Kong Government was well aware of the importance of
maintaining a sound and efficient banking system in order to
safeguard Hong Kong's image as an international financial centre.
A proposed Banking Ordinance Reform was announced in March, 1986,
aiming at amending the lopholes in the existing ordinance and to
better define the role of the Banking Commissioner.
We began our analysis by looking into the existing ordinance
in order to pinpoint lopholes. We then commented on the major
changes in the proposed Banking Ordinance. Finally we interviewed
bankers of different background, summarized their opinions and
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
During the past few years, banking industry of Hong Kong has
not been in a very good shape. Due to the slump in Hong Kong
property market, the amount of bad debts for banks involved in
domestic market are quite substantial. In Sept., 1983, a local
bank, Hang Lung Bank, suffered a run and became insolvent. The
bank was soon taken over by the Hong Kong Government, an
unprecendent move derivating from its usual non-intervention
policy, in order to resume confidence of depositors. However,
fraud was later discovered and some of the directors of the bank
were involved. In the High Court on Oct. 18, 1984, it was revealed
that a massive cheque-kitting exercise involving US$21.7 billion
was a material factor in the ultimate collapse of the bank and
Dollar Credit Finance Co., a deposit taking company which was found
to be insolvent in November, 1982.1
Unfortunately, another local bank with larger asset base,
the Overseas Trust Bank, ran into trouble in June, 1985. The
Overseas Trust Bank (hereinafter called OTB) is one of the biggest
local banks and has 43 branches in Hong Kong and 8 in overseas.
The crisis appeared to have been touched off by a fraudulent
diversion of funds, similar to the case of Hang Lung Bank and
1Cecillia Ko, "Watchdog that lost its bark," South China
Morning Post, Oct. 15, 1985.
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Dollar Credit Finance. Worried by potential fallout from the OTB
collapse, the Government took over the bank with a cost estimated
to be about HK$2 billion. No reasons have yet been given by the
Government for the suddent collapse of the bank except that of
suspected fraud. Several former shareholders and senior executives
were put on trial facing charges of conspiracy to defraud
shareholders and creditors of OTB. It was reported that some
missing funds, estimated to be as much as HK$2 billion, were loaned
to companies controlled by former directors. The insider
transactions took place not only in Hong Kong, but also in OTB's
offshore branches, mainly Macau and Colombo. In the past few
months, a total of 87 writs claiming repayment of almost HK$1.2
billion have been filed by OTB and its subsidiaries against 55
companies and 24 individuals. Meanwhile, the Financial Secretary
of Hong Kong has ordered investigations into eight major private
companies in the OTB empire. The problem at OTB also spilled over
to its 62 pct subsidiary - The Hongkong Industrial and Commercial
Bank. In fact, OTB was just about to close a deal with Hong Leong
Company to sell its stake in HICB for about HK$257 million. Not
surprisingly, Hong Leong Company promptly withdrew its bid and it
was later discovered that Hongkong Industrial and Commercial Bank
was involved in the fraudulence. A substantial sum of HICB's
non-performing loans, believed to be between HK$300 million and
HK$400 million, are pledged by OTB shares that were declared
valueless on the date of,the Government takeover.
The impact of OTB issue was much bigger than that of Hang
Lung Bank since it is one of the biggest local bank groups. Quite
a number of small local banks were under pressure and found their
3
deposits falling. The hardest hit victims was Ka Wah Bank, a small
local bank with assets totaled HK$5.4 billion as at Dec. 31, 1984.
In an unprecedented move, Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation
and Bank of China, Hong Kong, after consultation with the
Government, jointly pledged to support Ka Wah Bank by extending a
secured line of credit to them. While Hong Kong Bank has helped
the Government in past financial crises, this was the first time
that Bank of China steps in on Hong Kong's crisis. This move
suggested that China is willing to play a more important role in
Hong Kong even before it is due to take over from Britain.
The collapse of Hang Lung Bank and OTB has exposed the weak
banking supervision in Hong Kong. Even the most ardent
free-marketeers are convinced that tighter controls are necessary.
Actually, the Government has started to review the banking
supervision since Hang Lung's event. A team of Bank of England
officials were invited to Hong Kong and they completed a
confidential report on various aspects of prudent regulation in
Hong Kong in March 1984. In Feb. 1985, it was officially announced
that the supervision of banks and deposit-taking companies (DTCs)
9n Hong Kong would be revised and beginning in March, a number of
discussion papers prepared by the Banking Commissioner's office
were circulated to leading banks and DTCs. Subsequently, another
revised paper summarizing the reform proposals was circulated to
selected banks and DTCs. After almost one-year preparation, the
proposed amendment to the Banking Ordinance, The Banking Bill 1986,
was finally published in Government Gazette on march 7, 1986.
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Purpose of the Study
Hong Kong is not the only place experiencing a financial
panic of one form or another. Recent events, such as the
Continental Illinois and Johnson Matthey affairs, have shown that-
even in the U.S. and Britain, where central banking are well
established, the financial centre is not free of occassional
shocks. The rapid financial and technological innovation, while no
doubt creating new opportunities and benefits, has also enhanced
the risks of financial business. Consequently, banking supervision
becomes more essential and difficult job to the government.
Although the failures of some mismanaged banks and DTCs have
given it a bad name, Hong Kong's financial system is still
basically sound and resilient. While criticizing that the Banking
Commissioner has been too lax in the past, some bankers remind that
the authority should avoid the mistake of jeopardizing Hong Kong's
liberal business and regulatory environment which contributes
greatly to the rise of Hong Kong as an international financial
centre in the past decade. Nothing can do more damage to Hong
Kong's position as the third largest financial centre in the world
(at least on the criterion of quite a number of foreign
institutions) than a mass exodus of foreign financial institutions
at a time when Tokyo is opening up its financial markets, and
Singapore is still competing fiercely with Hong Kong.
The Financial Secretary of Hong Kong, Sir John Bremridge,
said in his budget speech in February 1985, The Government is not
advocating regulation for regulation's sake. Our aim is to promote
sound business practice, to provide a measure of protection for
depositors and investors, and hence, to consolidate Hong Kong's
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reputation as a major financial centre."
The purpose of our report is to study the various aspects of
the banking reform proposed and to see whether they are valid and
justified. It is also our intention to see whether the objectives
of the reform as mentioned by the Financial Secretary above will be
met. In the course of the analysis, the report will also highlight
the applications and impacts of the proposed changes to banks and
DTCs in Hong Kong.
Scope and Limitations
Due to limitation of time and resources, our discussion will
be confined to the issues contained in the Banking Bill 1986.
Specifically, our discussion will focus on the following
issues:
1. Liquidity Requirement.
2. Capital Adequacy- Capital to Risk Assets Ratio
(Risk Assets Ratio).
3. Discretionary Power of the Banking Commissioner.
4. Restrictions on Lending.
5. The Role of Auditors.
6CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY
In this research report, we try to touch on the up-coming
banking reform in Hong Kong which has attracted public attention
over the past few months. Since the reform will affect different
categories of people in the community, we have to make a complete
study of the past and present banking environment and draw opinions
from the related groups with a view to depicting a clear picture of
the reform, so that actions can be taken to reinforce and promote
the energetic and prosperous financial centre of Hong Kong.
Our study will relate to some significant events on banks
happened in the past few years in order to sort out the loopholes,
flaws and insufficiencies in the Ordinance, and to indicate the
area that has been the stumbling block to developing a sound and
efficient banking system in Hong Kong. Knowing the underlying
issues in the past will then lead us to project into the future
direction of the path, incorporating of course the recent
developments in the local community as well as overseas.
We purport to solicit comments and opinions from the widest
spectrum of related personnel possible for grossing up the
considerations that have to be taken in arriving at a new ordinance
which is theoretically and practically sound. The related groups
of personnel include:
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2) Practising bank internal accountants/auditors.
3) Practising CPAs having experience in bank auditing.
The means of obtaining information include:
1) Interviewing.
2) Extracts from magazines and professional journals.
We have interviewed senior executives of banks from
different countries. On the whole, their response was positive and
much fruitful information has been obtained. As to publicity, most
of them did not object to having their names disclosed in this
report. However, with very few exceptions, those executives from
the Bank of China group in Hong Kong declined any publicity. With
regard to this aspect, we have decided not to disclose any names of
the executives we have interviewed except that their opinion and
comments are classified by country background of the banks with
which these executives work for.
Conclusions drawn from the replies of the respondents will
be sorted out and categorized into functional areas. Our own
opinion will also be spelt out in order to arrive at an overall
proposal to the amended Ordinance which we believe would provide.
insight to the reform.
8CHAPTER III
ANTECEDENTS OF THE BANKING REFORM
BANK FAILURES DURING 1982-1986
Bank Failures Since 1982
The Hang Lung Event
In September 1983, the Legislative Council, in an
unprecedented move, passed the Hang Lung Bank (Acquisition) Bill,
authorizing the Government to take over Hang Lung Bank. Due to
liquidity problem, Hang Lung first experienced a run in 1982. It
was at a time when the British and Chinese Governments were holding
talks about the future of Hong Kong after 1997 when Hong Kong will
be turned over to China. The panic from the local community,
brought about by the uncertain political atmosphere, sent US sky
high against HK4 as the public was scrambling for foreign
currency. The stock and property market went down, as most people
were trying to take refuge overseas, and, like a chain reaction,
affected many business adversely.
The take-over was an unusual move on the part of the
Government in light of its normal non-intervention policy. It was
felt, however, that the main reason for its action was because of
the Sino-British Agreement. Under this agreement, the Hong Kong
Government has the responsibility to maintain the prosperity and
stability of Hong Kong for the transitional years before 1997.
Following the bank run, several banks including some
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overseas banks, withdrew the facilities they previously granted
Hang Lung. It subsequently led to the incapability of Hang Lung to
honour cheques amounting HK140 million and it was at this time the
Government stepped in. Later, in the High Court, it was revealed.
that a massive cheque-kitting exercise involving US421.7 billion
was the single material factor which led to the collapse of Hang
Lung Bank and Dollar Credit Finance.
Soon after the Hang Lung incident, a Special Committee
consisting of economists and bankers was set up to study the case.
Recommendations of the study group were that there should be
government intervention for commercial failures, stronger
government supervision over the banking sector, and the possibility
of introducing deposit insurance.
No doubt the Hang Lung incident proved how political factors
could affect monetary decisions. The run came at a time when
uncertainty of the future caused panic in the local community and
the Government, anxious to maintain stability in the local economy,
stepped in to support the failing bank.
The OTB Event
As the Hang Lung incident gradually faded from the public's
memory, in June 1985, much to the surprise of everyone, the
directors of overseas Trust Bank (hereafter called OTB) submitted a
declaration to the Banking Commissioner stating that the bank was
insolvent and that it was unable to continue operation. In the
evening, the Financial Secretary, Sir John Bremridge, together with
the Banking Commissioner, Mr. Robert Fell, ordered temporary
closure of all branches of OTB until further notice. At the same
time, the managing director of OTB, a Malaysian Chinese, was
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detained at the airport as he was trying to leave Hong Kong,
carrying with him cash and securities exceeding HK$l million. The
Commercial Crimes Bureau also stepped in investigating the affairs
of the bank and subsequently three other directors were also
detained.
On the next day, the Legislative Council passed the overseas
Trust Bank (Acquisition) Bill authorizing the Government to take
over OTB. This was the second time in three years that the
Government had nationalized a private enterprise for preventing
it from going bankrupt. Initially the cost for rescuing OTB was
estimated in the region of HK$2 billion. The money was to come
from the Exchange Fund which is equivalent to Hong Kong's foreign
exchanqe reserve.
OTB has a larger asset base compared with Hang Lung and is
one of the largest local banks operating in Hong Kong. It has 43
local and 8 overseas branches. The collapse of OTB was, of course
viewed as another example of weak banking supervision, of insider
transaction between a bank and its shareholders.
Depositors' interests were safeguarded by government
intervention but at the expenses of taxpayers. No reason was given
by the Government for the sudden collapse of the bank except for
suspected fraud. OTB, like Hang Lung, was also involved in the
cheque-kitting cycle at some stage. Later, several former
shareholders and senior executives of the bank were being charged
for conspiracy to defraud shareholders and creditors of the bank.
The problems at OTB spilled over to Hong Kong Industrial and
Commercial Bank (HICB), its 62%-owned subsidiary. Actually at this
time, OTB was negotiating with Hong Leong Co. for the sale to the
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latter of OTB's 62% share of HICB for HK$256.75 million. This
deal, however, finally fell with Hong Leong withdrawing its
purchase agreement. On the date of government takeover, a
substantial sum of HICB's non-performing loans, between HK 300
million to HK$400 million, were declared valueless and, as a
result, a HK$408 million rescue package was announced to prop up
the insolvent HICB.
After an initial review of OTB books, it was found that as
much as HK 2 billion missing funds were loaned to companies
controlled by its former directors. These transactions took place
not only in Hong Kong but via OTB offshore branches, mainly in
Macau and Colombo. Part of the missing funds, estimated at around
HK$800 million, was lent to a finance company, Dominion Finance
Ltd. headed by Simon Yip, by means of cheque-kitting exercise. The
loans were approved with inadequate or no securities or
collateral. As a result, a total of 87 writs claiming repayment
for almost HK1.2 billion was filled by OTB and its subsidiaries
against 55 companies and 24 individuals. The sum claimed on each
writ was below HK100 million and thus none was an incident of
violation of the legal lending restriction to a single borrower as
laid down in the Banking Ordinance. Total exposure, however, of
all these companies represented 80% of total shareholders' funds
plus retained earnings of the OTB group.
The boards of OTB and HICB then petitioned the High Court to
wind up 18 companies, some of which were believed to be those
controlled by the ruling family. These companies were connected
closely with one another with several OTB shareholders being the
ultimate controllers. Following the collapse of OTB, most of the
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directors of these companies also resigned from their respective
boards.
In order to restore the capital base of OTB, which was wiped
out by a consolidated loss of $3.05 billion in the year ending June
30, 1985, the Government had to inject $2 billion to restore it.
The capital injection, which was made in the form on non-interest
bearing redeemable preference shares of $1 each subscribed by the
Government, restored OTB's shareholders' funds to $545 million from
a deficit of $1.45 billion. Aside from the $2 billion which is
visible on the balance sheet, additional funds had to be injected
into the bank's inner reserve. Only at this time the bank could
finally operate viably again.
The additional capital acted as a cushion against continuing
loses until such time as the bank could recover the debts or
dispose the securities. Most of the bad debts, estimated to be as
much as HK$2 billion, were from loans to parties associated with
former directors and shareholders of OTB. A substantial portion of
the problem loans were advanced through the bank's Macau branch
which was believed to the major vehicle used to channel the missing
funds.
As in the case of Hang Lung, a substantial number of
depositors and banks withdrew their deposits and credit lines even
after the government take-over. Cash on hand and deposits with
other banks and deposit-taking companies dropped by as much as
71%. Values of certain loans had to be written down and mostly all
the other accounts on the balance sheet i.e. deposits, other
provisions, fixed assets etc. had to be revaluated down. As a
result, the size of the balance sheet on the whole shrunk by almost
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40%. The loss incurred completely wiped out shareholders' funds.
The main. task for OTB's new management was to control the
losses and set out procedures for recovering the doubtful loans.
Also, proper internal control systems had to be set up in order to
build new business.
The OTB crisis was a hard lesson for the regulatory
authorities. It showed how existing banking laws failed to
monitor, on a consolidated basis, excessive exposure to companies
controlled by the same group of owners. But most importantly, it
showed how weak the Banking Commissioner and the auditors were in
detecting irregularities which apparently had existed over a long
period of time. As government investigators dug deeper, their
estimates of allegedly improper loans rose. Many of these loans
were made to several of the bank's former executives and their
associated companies. These loans were inadequately secured or
backed by properties and shares whose prices have plummeted. There
was a substantial portion of non-productive loans and it would take
a long time before the bank could be profitable again.
The bank's problems were compounded by the difficulty it
faced in trying to attract depositors. In the six months following
the take-over, existing depositors defected and total customer
depositors reduced by 70%. Again, this raised further questions at
the Government's weak supervision of banks.
The Ka Wah Event
The OTB crisis sent a series of shock waves through the
local banking circle. It affected especially the small local banks
which are traditionally run by one family. As depositors lost
faith, a dozen or so of these banks were subjected to widespread
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speculation and the Ka Wah Bank was the first to get hit. Ka Wah,
controlled by a Singaporean family, had minor business association
with OTB. It is a relatively small bank with only 27 local offices
and one branch each in Los Angeles and New York. In order to ease*
the situation, in an unprecedented move, the Hong Kong Bank and the
Bank of China agreed to jointly support Ka Wah. The pledge of
support, made in consultation with the Government, represented a
growing role in Hong Kong affairs for China before 1997.
The Bank of China, whose branch here heads a group of 13
Beijing-controlled banks, has not played such a role prior to the
Ka Wah incident. The two big banks jointly extended a substantial
line of credit to Ka Wah aiming at assuring depositors. Even so,
due to the significant amount of non-performing loans extended to
the collapsed Pan-Electric Group in Singapore, most of Ka Wah's
reserves has been wiped off. In an action to safeguard the local
banking system, the Hong Kong Government started nogotiating with
China International Trust and Investment Corporation for the
acquisition of 92% of Ka Wah's shares with a guarantee from the
Hong Kong Government for the doubtful loans.
The Wing On Event
Most of the other local banks lookea tor stronger partners.
In December 1985, Wing On Bank, which was traditionally controlled
by the Kwok family, agreed to sell 51% of its shares to Hang Seng
Bank. This meant, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation,
the parent bank of Hang Seng Bank, is embracing another local bank
into the group. In principle, Hang Seng will acquire a controlling
interest in Wing On Bank. It was not an attractive deal for Hang
Seng at the time if purely viewed from commercial viewpoint, but it
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is considered imperative for maintaining stability in the local
banking system. This responsibility which traditionally was
shouldered by Hong Kong Bank is now also shared by the Bank of
China group. The transaction, of course, could be viewed as
another rescue operation for a small local bank.
Apart from the unfavourable market conditions, Wing On Bank
was in a tight capital position after providing for substantial bad
and doubtful debts. Shareholders' funds shrunk by more than 42%
compared with previous years' figures. Moreover, the bank needs
stronger management.
Partnership with a strong partner should be helpful for
long-term development as well as for solving immediate problems.
Wing On Bank, with 50 years' history, had a strong retail customer
base among the Chinese community.
The Union Bank Event
On March 27, 1986, the Government rescued another troubled
local bank, Union Bank of Hong Kong. In an unprecedented move, the
Banking Commissioner announced that after consultation with the
Financial Secretary, he decided to take over the managerial control
of Union Bank. Jardine Fleming Company, a local merchant bank, was
appointed to run the bank on behalf of the Commissioner. It was
also announced that the Exchange Fund had also made available a
substantial credit line to the bank to meet the claims of all
depositors and other creditors.
This was the first time the Banking Commissioner exercised
his power under Section 13 (1) (iii) of the Banking Ordiance to
take over the managerial control of a bank. But unlike the cases
of Hang Lung and O TB, the Government emphasised that Union Bank is
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still solvent despite its liquidity and loan problems. The
Commissioner explained that his action was triggered off by the
prolonged absence of Union Bank's chairman Mr. Oen Yin-choy from
Hong Kong since last September and the resignation of six
directors, leaving the bank in a deteriorating liquidity position
and without management direction.
Union Bank is a relatively small bank controlled by
Southeast Asian Chinese. It is a heavy lender to many Indonesian
companies which have been hit hard by falling oil prices and
Indonesia's economic slowdown. Consequently, Union Bank's problem
debts mounted. Furthermore, the bank's liquidity has been squeezed
by a flight of deposits following rumors that the bank was in
trouble since early this year.
The Union Bank event is expected to hasten the search among
the remaining family-owned banks for a strong partner or the
so-called "big daddy."
Despite repeated official reassurances, confidence in Hong
Kong's banking system remained shaky. After the O TB take-over,
officials warned that the Government might not again use public
funds for another rescue. These remarks taken by the public as
warning that they could expect no more government protection,
prompted some depositors to defect from small local banks. Hong
Kong really does not have any clearly stated government policy on
shoring up banks in the event of a liquidity crunch. Without
deposit insurance or a central bank to act as a lender of last
resort, depositors really have no assurance of protection. The few
incidents as illustrated above only affected a few relatively small
local banks but still the collapse of even one or two of them could
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have severe repercussions
Causes of Bank Failures
The failure of these four banks has drawn public attention
to the common features of these banks. People believe that the
occurance of these events do have much to do with the background of
the banks.
Invariably the events happened with the local Chinese banks
which established a few decades ago by the big families then in
Hong Kong. At that time, banking business in Hong Kong was still
at a rather stagnant stage. Competition was not keen. The banks
were set up to serve mainly the local Chinese businessmen who were
doing business in a traditionally conservative manner. These banks
grew with the progress of the economy of Hong Kong. As Hong Kong
became more internationalized, foreign banks started penetrating
into this lucrative market. The foreign banks were much larger in
size and used modern management concepts. Noting that the owners
and the management of the Chinese banks were not well educated and
that they ran the bank in the same way as they ran their other
family business, they began to be driven out of the business. What
they still maintained were the business relationship with the
medium to small Chinese firms.
A very common feature among these Chinese banks is the
management philosophy. It was commonly highly centralized in the
hands of the owners of their offsprings.
A bank is different from a firm in that it uses public's
money for operation. However, the centralization of power has
rendered the chief executive of these Chinese banks negligent of-
this fact. They tended to view the bank as one of the firms they
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were controlling. As such they were actually taking the public
depositors on a ride.
The effect of mismanagement had rendered tons of money
channeled to incompetent borrowers, many of which were controlled
by the directors or shareholders of the bank.
The mix-up of public and private interests had led to the
subsequent failures. Many of these borrowers actually lacked the
required collaterals to secure the bank loans accorded to them.
Yet, tactful arrangement of diversified borrowers had made the
lendings in compliance with the Banking Ordinance on credit limit.
OTB and Ka Wah were closely related to Southeast Asian
Chinese businessmen. The chain of business failures among the
overseas Chinese to whom these two banks had extended substantial
credit was an important factor to the failure of these two banks.
These banks all have loose credit control policy. And
regardless of whether there were acts of fraud, it is obvious that
credits had been extended either to incompetent borrowers or to
borrowers without sufficient collateral.
Consequence of Bank Failures
The series of events cautioned the public as to the
capabilities of the independent auditors and the effectiveness of
aovernment supervision.
People just could not imagine how the auditors could have
overlooked the seemingly apparent irregularities on the books.
The Banking Commissioner was being particularly criticized.
Public complaint tended to divulge to the fact that government
supervision on the banks had been too loose and imprudent. What
WA-q most sarcastical was the Banking Commissioner's comments on
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some of these ailing banks as "healthy" before the failures were
disclosed.
As a result of these events, public opinion was diverted to
a complete reform on the existing Banking Ordinance and the
discretionary authority of the Banking Commissioner.
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CHAPTER IV
THE 1986 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
THE BANKING ORDINANCE
The Existing Legislation
The following are the major areas on which the Government
imposes control on the banking sector via the Banking Ordinance:
a. Maintenance of a minimum liquid asset ratio of 25%;
b. No company incorporated in Hong Kong shall be granted a
banking licence unless its issued and paid-up capital is
not less than $100 million;
c. Adequate provision for bad and doubtful loans should
have been made against earnings;
d. No dividend should be paid unless all intangible assets
have been written off and the paid-up capital and
reserves should be not less than $200 million after
payment of dividend;
e. No loan could be granted against the shares of the bank
as collateral;
f. Loans to one individual or corporation should not exceed
25% of the paid-up capital and reserves;
g. Loans to directors of the bank and their relatives
should not exceed 10% of the paid-up capita and reserves,
h. Clean loans to employees should not exceed one year
salary of the employee;
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i. Cannot participate in wholesale, retail, import and
export trade;
j. Submit Wednesday and monthly returns reflecting the
bank's financial position.
Spirit of the Ordinance
The basic spirit of the Ordinance could be summed up as
follows:
1. To ensure adequate liquidity;
2. To ensure a healthy capital level;
3. To ensure any bad loans will be reflected in the
earnings;
4. To safeguard the assets of the bank from "putting all
eggs in one basket;"
5. To prevent overlending to bank staff;
6. To ensure the bank not going into non-bank businesses
7. To prevent the bank from going into highly risky
business where large amount of capital would be tied up
8. To ensure the Commissioner has adequate information of
the bank.
The Banking Bill 1986
The Banking Bill 1986 is a combination of existing ianKing
Ordinance (Cap. 155) and Deposit-taking Companies Ordinance (Cap.
328) with amendments and modifications.
While the Capital to Risk Assets Ratio is completely new,
major changes concentrate on the following areas: Liquidity Ratio,
Restriction on Loans, Management and Ownership, Roles of the
Banking Commissioner and Audits.
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We will discuss the above areas one by one, except that the
Roles of the Banking Commissioner and Management and Ownership will
be discussed together under the section Discretionary Power of the
Banking Commissioner.
When the Bill will come into operation is still not yet
fixed, but there is a power at clause 1(2) of the Bill to appoint
different dates for different provisions. It is expected that
there will probably be a two-year transitional period for
implementation of the Capital to Risk Assets after other provisions
of the Bill are brought into operation1 while liquidity ratio
will be implemented at the time the Bill comes into operation.2
Liquidity Requirements
A. Specified Liquid Assets
At present, Banks and DTCs are required to maintain a
minimum holding of Specified Liquid Assets which should be not less
than a certain percentage of their deposit liabilities specified by
the Banking Commissioner.
Specified Liquid Assets refer to the following:'
(a) notes and coins which are legal tender in Hong Kong or in
other currency which is freely remittable to the bank in Hong
Kong (bank hereinafter also refer to DTC)
(b) refined gold in the form of coin or bars situated either in
Hong Kong or some other place from which the gold, or money
1Banking Bill 1986, p. c207.
2lbid.
3Banking Ordinance, Revised Edition 1983, Section 18.
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into which it can be converted, is freely remittable to the
bank in Hong Kong;
(c) the total balance of money payable on demand at, and money at
call with, other banks or any DTC in Hong Kong or outside Hong
Kong which are freely remittable to the bank in Hong Kong and
held in a form approved by the Banking Commissioner;
(d) Certificates of deposit which are issued outside Hong Kong by
any bank approved by the Commissioner in any foreign currency
freely remittable to the bank in Hong Kong and marketable in a
manner satisfactory to the Commissioner. In normal practice,
those certificates of deposit issued by banks in international
financial centres like London, New York, Singapore, and Tokyo
are acceptable to the Commissioner to be treated as liquid
assets.
(e) such money market instruments, whether totally or to such
limited extent, as the Financial Secretary may specify by
notice in Gazette;
(f) treasury bills, maturing within 93 days, issued by the
Government or by the U.K. Government or Government of any
other country specified by the Financial Secretary;
(g) money at short notice at other banks or DTCs in Hong Kong or
at any bank outside Hong Kong, which is freely remittable to
the bank in Hong Kong and held in a form approved by the
Commissioner;
(h) such money market instruments, either totally or to such
limited extent, other than those specified under item (e)
above, as the Financial Secretary may specify by notice in the
Gazette;
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(i) bills of exchange payable at usance outside Hong Kong and
discountable in a currency which is freely remittable to the
bank in Hong Kong;
(j) bills of exchange payable after sight outside Hong Kong in a
currency freely remittable to the bank in Hong Kong
(k) such securities, other than those specified in the next item,
issued or guaranteed by the Government, or the Government of
any other country, as may be specified by the Financial
Secretary and published in the Gazette;
(1) securities with less than 5 years to maturity issued or
guaranteed by the Government or the Government of the United
Kingdom, if-
i) they are quoted on a Stock Exchange in London, Hong Kong
or New York;
ii) they have been dealt in during the preceeding 6 months
iii) payment of interest thereon is not in arrear.
In item (c), the term "Money at Call" means money payable
within not more than 24 hours of a demand, excluding money payable
on demand. Interbank deposits maturing the next day and overnight
interbank deposits are also classified as Money at Call.
In item (g), the term "Money at Short Notice" means money,
other than Money at Call and Money Payable on Demand, payable
within 7 days of a demand therefore. Interbank deposits maturing
within 7 days, excluding those maturing the next day, and interbank
1-week deposits are also classified as Money at Short Notice.
However, when a bank/DTC is claiming its balance of money
payable on demand, money at call and money at short notice as
specified liquid assets, its total liabilities in respect of those
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3 items owing to other banks or DTCs should be deducted accordingly.
B. Present Liquidity Requirement
In accordance with the Banking Ordinance, a bank has to
maintain a minimum holding of Specified Liquid Assets not less than
25% of the deposit liabilities of the bank during each month. In
addition, the Specified Liquid Assets held shall include not less
than the equivalent of 15% of the deposit liabilities of the bank
in the form of item (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) as listed above.
i) Specified Liquid Assets Not less than 15% of
total Deposit Liabilities(a)+ (b)+ (c)...... (f)
ii) Specified Liquid Assets Not less than 25% of
total Deposit Liabilities(a)+ (b)+ (c).....+(1)
The Deposit Liabilities of a bank/DTC refer to its gross
demand, time and savings account liabilities, excluding amounts
owing to otherbanks or any deposit-taking company. The arithmatic
means of a bank's specified liquid assets and deposit liabilities
on each Wednesday, or the last preceding working day when Wednesday
is a public holiday, is calculated and is regarded as the liquidity
ratio maintained by the bank for that particular month. Reports of
liquidity ratio on each Wednesday and the arithmatic mean for each
month are submitted to the Banking Commissioner for inspection.
As for deposit-taking compnies, the requirement is slightly
different though definition of Specified Liquid Assets and method
of calculating interbank assets are identical.
In the case of deposit-taking companies, Deposit Liabilities
are classified into two categories:
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DL(A)-- Deposit liabilities repayable within 7 days
DL(B)-- Deposit liabilities repayable after 7 days
The following requirements have to be fulfilled.
(i) The total amount of Specified
Liquid Assets in the form of Not less than
Item (a) to (f) as listed 60% of (30% DL(a)+ 15% DL(b))
above
(ii) The aggregate amount of
Specified Liquid Assets Not less than
30% DL(A)+ 15% DL(B)in the form of Item (a)
to (1)
C. Present Loopholes
As mentioned above, a bank's/DTC's borrowing from other
banks or deposit-taking companies in Hong Kong within 7 days have
to be deducted from its total balance of money payable on demand,
at call and at short notice accordingly. However, those borrowings
from banks outside Hong Kong are not accountable for the
reduction. Taking advantage of this, a bank can creat as many
artificial specified liquid assets as it wishes, using the
technique of round-tripping via offshore bank intermediaries.
For example, a bank can create US100 million Specified
Liquid Assets on Wednesday by the following transactions:
(i) Borrow from its London branch US$100 million
repayable that next day
(ii) Value the same day, lend to its Singapore branch
US100 million repayable the next day
(iii) Its Singapore branch lend back the US$L00 million
fn its London branch for the same tenor
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No movement of funds is necessary out of the above transactions.
Since the borrowing from its London branch is not to be
reduced from its interbank assets based on the ground that the
lender is outside Hong Kong, the bank has increased its total
balance of Money at Call by US 100 million, equivalent to HK0780
million, and thereby fulfill the liquidity requirement.
Lending overnight money in domestic interbank market in
foreign currencies and squaring its position by borrowing back from
other banks outside Hong Kong will have the same effect, but it may
cost the bank more expenses such as brokerage and telex chargs
since it involves real interbank transactions and movement of
funds. We were told by more than one international money brokers
that every Wednesday quite a number of banks often refuse to borrow
overnight deposits from local lender except those in Hong Kong
dollars which is impossible to borrow from sources outside Hong
Kong. As the size of the Euro-currency market is so big that it is
easy for a bank to borrow substantial amount of currency like U.S.
dollar, banks can easily create artificial specified liquid assets
as fihPV wish.
It seems that the "Roundtripping" is an open secret in the
banking industry. We have chosen a very small sample of 15 money
market dealers of Treasury Departments from various banks and
deposit-taking companies. More than half of them admitted that
their institutions had used the roundtripping when their holding of
specified liquid assets were below the required percentage. Some
were done through real transactions with various counterparties
while others were done just over the books of their own overseas
branches.
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Although our sample size is certainly too small, it at least
proved that roundtrippig does exist and is used by some
institutions from time to time.
D. New Liquidity Ratio Requirement
In view of the above loophole, a new liquidity ratio
requirement is proposed in the Banking Bill 1986. It is in fact a
different approach to measure the liquidity of a bank or
deposit-taking company.
The liquidity ratio of a bank or DTC (hereinafter called an
authorized institution) shall be calculated as a ratio between the
Liquefiable Assets and Qualifying Liabilities. And it shall be
calculated for each month on the basis of the average of the daily
liquidity ratio for that month.1
It is proposed that both banks and DTCs should maintain a
liquidity ratio of not less than 25% in any calendar month,
although the percentage may be varied by the Financial Secretary by
notice in the Gazette if he thinks it fit to do so.
The Qualifying Liabilities of an authorized institution is
defined as the sum of:
i) its net interbank liabilities (including marketable
claims) both in and outside Hong Kong and
ii) all its other liabilities
maturing or callable within one montn.
The Liquefiable Assets of an authorized institution shall be
calculated by adding the book value or current market value,
1Banking Bill 1986, Part XVIII.
2Ibid., Fourth Schedule.
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whichever is the lesser, in Hong Kong dollars, of such of its
following assets which are freely available to meet any qualifying
liabilities:
(a) net interbank claims (including marketable claims) both in and
outside Hong Kong maturing or callable within one month;
(b) cash in till;
(c) gold;
(d) unmatured discountable export bills maturing within 6 months
and export bills which are payable after sight, denominated in
a currency freely convertible into Hong Kong dollars;
(e) bills, certificates, notes, paper and debt securities (other
than marketable claims maturing or callable within one month)
which:
(i) are negotiable;
(ii) have a remaining term to maturity of not more than
10 years;
(iii) are issued by persons whose debts have not been
in arrears within the immediatey preceeding five years;
(iv) are denominated and traded in a currency freely
convertible into Hong Kong dollars; and
(v) are quoted on a stock exchange approved by the
Commissioner for the purpose of this Schedule or by
not less than 2 brokers recognized by the Commissioner
(f) securities issued or guarantees by the uovernmenu or any owner
Government approved by the Commissioner;
(g) performing loans, instalments of loans including interest on
such loans which will be paid in cash within one month, but




The new Liquidity Ratio Requirement will replace the
Specified Liquid Assets requirement under the existing
legislation. If we compare the Liquefiable Assets with the
Specified Liquid Assets, we will find that they are more or less
the same. Item (g), performing loans repayable within one month,
is newly added. The requirements and the range of securities to be
included as liquid assets are more specific than the existing
statutes. It appears that the Commissioner intends to allow more
variety of securities such as Euro-notes and commercial papers to
be treated as liquefiable assets.
The method of calculating the new ratio, together with the
assets and liabilities to be taken into account, are contained in
the Schedule to the Bill so that it will be much easier for the
Commissioner to make any alteration when it is deemed necessary.
In the explanatory memorandum of the Bill, it is said that
the ratio is considered to be an improvement over existing
liquidity requirements because those requirements take no account
of cash inflows and outflows an institution reasonably expects over
a period of time. In fact, the roundtripping will no longer be
workable since borrowing from banks outside Hong Kong will also be
counted under the new method of calculation.
Nevertheless some people argue that a bank can still cir-
cumvent the new requirement by borrowing long and lending short,
For instance, if a bank borrow HK100 million for two months and
lend back the same amount for a period of one month, the
1Banking Bill 1986, Fourth Schedule.
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bank will have an extra liquefiable assets for uxtlnn millinn_
It is true that a bank can create liquefiable assets by
using above method but by so doing, the bank has created a
maturity gap which is subject to fluctuation of interest rate and
the cost for the bank may be high as normally short-term money is
cheaper than long term. Besides, it will be more easily
discoveraged by the Commissioner if both transactions are done
through the books of the bank's overseas branches and interest
rates are artifically fixed at the same price.
Some bankers believed that the new liquidity ratio will make
banks and DTCs less aggressive in mismatching their borrowing and
lending.1 AS the calculation format is more strict, some
institutions will need to modify their policies on treasury
management. It is now a common practice for banks to adopt a
"Borrowing short and lending long" policy, i.e. to borrow
short-term money to finance longer term loans as short term funds
are cheaper given a normal positive-slope yield curve. The new
requirement will still allow banks/DTCs to mismatch their borrowing
and lending, but the maturity gap between short-term funds and
long-term loans will be narrowed, since an institution will have to
match at least its assets and liabilities within the short end.
Mr. K. K. Wong, the Assistant Banking Commissioner, said
that it is not desirable for an institution to be too aggressive in
its mismatch of funding and that the maturity gap will be closely
monitored in future through the new monethly statistical return.2
lCecilia Ko, "Making Banks less Aggressive", South China
Morning Post, March 17, 1986.
2Ibid.
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it should also be noted that a contravention of the new
liquidity ratio will not be an offence in itself, but failure to
report the contravention or to carry out remedial action required
by the Commissioner is an offence. An authorized institution may
appeal to the Financial Secretary against any such remedial
action. The Commissioner also has the power to vary the ratio for
particular authorized institutions but, unlike thecapital to risk
assets ratio to be discussed later, no upper limit is set. This
provides the Commissioner with flexibility to cope with situations
where some smaller local banks are hurt by rumor and find
themselves unable to borrow money from the interbank market while
depositors are withdrawing huge amount of money from them. And
should the Commissioner foresees that a certain institution may run
into troubles and have difficulty in funding, he may request the
bank to keep a higher liquidity ratio beforehand.
E. Charges over Bank's Assets
Apart from the new liquidity ratio requirement, a new
clause, Clause 110, has been inserted in Part XVIII- LIQUIDITY
RATIO OF AUTHORIZED INSTITUTIONS AND MATTERS AFFECTING LIQUIDITY
RATIO of the Bill. Although it does not directly relate to the
liquidity ratio, it relates to matters which may affect the ratio.
The clause provides that an authorized institution shall
not, except with the approval of the Commissioner, cause the sum of
all charges over its assets in Hong Kong to exceed 5% of the
aggregate total of the value of those assets. And when any civil
proceedings has been instituted against the authorized institution
to recover claimed indebtedness, the institution shall, if the
proceeding. could adversely affect the financial position of the
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institution, notify the Commissioner of the proceeding.
The term charges here includes liens, encumbrances,
equitable interests and third party rights.1
Capital Adequacy and Capital
to Risk Assets Ratio
Capital Adequacy is important to the banking system since
one of the primary functions of capital is to enable losses to be
sustained without threatening the closure of bank or otherwise
prejudicing the interests of depositors.
The existing legislation prescribes minimum capital
requirements for banks and deposit-taking companies:
Licensed Banks: Issued and Paid-up Share Caspital Not less than
HK4100,000,000
Licensed DTCs: Issued Share Capital Not less than HK100,000,000
Paid-up Share Capital Not less than HK$ 75,000,000
Not less than HK$ 10,000,000Registered DTCs: Paid-up Share Capital
Since the minimum capital requirements for banks and
deposit-taking companies bear no relationship to the amount and
riskiness of the assets they support, a measure of capital to risk
assets ratio is introduced to remedy the deficiency. The ratio
simply compares capital with risk assets as a common measure of
capital adequacy. Originally, the ratio was proposed to be set at
10%. Due to objections from a large number of banks and DTCs, it
has finally been set at 5%. However, the Commissioner has the
power to increase the rtio for particular institutions to a
'Banking Bill 1986, Clause 110 (6).
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"ceiling" of 8% in the case of banks and 10% in the case of
deposit-taking companies, though that particular bank or DTC may
appeal to the Financial Secretary against the imposition of such
higher ratio.
The method of calculation of the ratio, together with the
capital base and the risk assets to be taken into account, are
contained in the Third Schedule to the Bill so that it may be
easier for the Commissioner to make any alteration when it is
deemed necessary.
A. Capital Base
According to the Schedule, the capital base of a bank/DTC
shall be calculated by adding up the value of the following:
(a) paid-up capital;
(b) perpetual subordinated debt convertible into equity at
option of issuer, but excluding any amount in excess of
half the paid-up capital;
(c) general reserves, including inner reserves, share
premium account and revaluation reserves, but excluding
provisions however described; and
(d) undistributed profits, but excluding unprovided but
declared dividends not yet paid.
And by deducting the value of the following:
(i) investments in any subsidiary, any associated company
and any holding company;
(ii) loans and other expenses which in the opinion of the
Commissioner are of a capital nature; and
iii) goodwill.1
lBankinq Bill 1986, Third Schedule.
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B. Risk Assets
Different risk weights will be used to multiply the value of
various categories of assets when computing the total value of risk
assets of a certain authorized institution,
(a) Category I- risk weight 0.0:
(i) Government certificates of indebtedness held for note
issue
(ii) cash in till and
(iii) contingent liabilities in respect of forward foreign
exchange contracts, interest rate swaps, option
contracts, futures contracts, bills held for collection
of customers, and shipping guarantees and trust
receipts in respect of unmatured trade finance
transactions.
(b) Category II- risk weight 0.2:
(i) unsubordinated claims on or contingent liabilities in
respect of eligible banksl or eligible governments,2
or having such banks or governments unconditional
guarantee, maturing or callable within less than one
year
(ii) claims or contingent liabilities secured by cash or
1Eligible bank means any bank or licensed deposit-taking
company in Hong Kong or any other bank incorporated outside Hong
Kong except such a bank which is, in the opinion of the
Commissioner, not adequately supervised by the appropriate
recognized banking supervisory authority of the place in which it
is incorporated.
2Eligible government means the Hong Kong government any
other government whose debt has not been in arrears at any time
during the 5 years immediately preceding the date on which the
relevant calculation of the capital to risk assets ratio is made
and any other government approved by the Commissioner.
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cash deposits with the institution under its complete
control; and
(iii) bullion or listed securities held against the
institution's liability to customers or under resale
agreements,
(c) Category III- risk weight 0.5:
(i) negotiable unsubordinated bills, notes, paper and
listed securities, at current market value, with a
remaining term to maturity of not less than one and not
more than 10 years, drawn on or issued or guaranteed by
eligible banks or eligible governments, and which are
quoted on a stock exchange approved by the Commissioner
or by not less than 2 brokers recognized by the
Commissioner for this purpose;
(ii) unmatured import and export trade finance through bills
or notes maturing within 6 months;
(iii) unsubordinated claims on or contingent liabilities in
respect of registered deposit-taking companies (except
deposit-taking companies the registration of which is
for the time being suspended) or having such companies
unconditional guarantee, maturing or callable within
less than one year; and
(iv) all contingent liabilities not otherwise specified in
this term, and including any net underwriting
commitments.
(d) Category IV- risk weight 1.0:
All other assets.
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C. Capital to Risk Assets Ratio
The ratio is to be calculated as follows:
CAPITAL TO RISK CAPITAL BASE
ASSETS RATIO RISK ASSETS
The Risk Assets Ratio is one of the most controversial
tropics when consultation with the banking community was being
conducted by the Commissioner.
Originally, it was suggested that the ratio should be set at
10% but due to objections from the banking community, the ratio
was finally set at 5%. It was also decided that the ratio should
only be applicable to those authorized institutions incorporated in
Hong Kong based on the ground that it should be the sole
responsibility for foreign banking authority to supervise their own
banks. However, some foreign banks are still not pleased with the
arrangement. Japanese banks' subsidiary DTCs are especially upset
by the new ratio which they find it hard to comply. Due to Hong
Kong's low taxation and relatively free regulatory environment,
most of the Japanese DTCs are incorporated in Hong Kong to act on
behalf of their parents to arrange and book offshore loans for the
Asian region. The DTCs here are also used to issue Eurodollar bond
or notes under guarantee of their parents.
It is reported that out of 23 DTCs of Japanese banks, only
three comply with the statutory ratio of 5% and the ratio of the
others only averages about 3%.1 As a large portion of their
asset portfolios comprises offshore loans, loans to parent banks
'Cecilia Ko, "Japanese may pull out DTC Risk Assets",
South China Morning Post, Mawrch 17, 1986.
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and securities held as trading assets, Japanese bankers argue that
all DTCs doing similiar offshore banking business like them should
be exempted from the risk assets ratio measure.
Before the disclosure of the banking bill, it was reported
that the present three-tier banking system might be changed and the
Commissioner had considered establishing a new class of limited
service banks to solve the problem.1 As the Japanese Government
is also considering introducing a similar capital adequacy ratio,
Japanese bankers may have to accept the concept eventually although
further debate on the calculation of the ratio between them and the
Commissioner seems to be unavoidable.
As for local banks and DTCs, it would certainly be tough
years ahead for them to adjust to the new requirement, though a
two-year transitional period will be given to them.
Their capital base and asset composition will certainly have
to be restructured. It is expected that smaller local banks will
be put into a more difficult position to compete with foreign
competitors once the Risk Assets Ratio is imposed on them.
Discretionary Power of the
Banking Commissioner
One of the most important things in the proposed banking
reform is the change of approach from rule-based supervision to the
use of more discretionary judgement by the Banking Commissioner.
Under the new legislation, the Commissioner will be granted more
power to operate more on a discretionary basis, relying more on his
judgements about the capacity of management in each bank/DTC to
1Ming Pao Evening News, March 13, 1986.
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cope with the challenges it faces.
In Clause.7 of the Banking Bill, it is stated that the
principal function of the Commissioner is to promote the general
stability and effective working of the banking system and the
Commissioner shall:
(a) be responsible for supervising compliance with the
provisions of Banking Ordinance
(b) take all reasonable steps to ensure that the principal
places of business, local branches, overseas branches
and overseas representative offices of all authorised
institutions and local representative offices are
operated in a responsible, honest and business-like
manner;
(c) promote and encourage proper standards of conduct and
sound business practices amongst authorized
institutions;
(d) suppress or aid in suppressing illegal, dishonourable
or improper practices in relation to the business
practices of authorized institutions;
(e) co-operate with and assist recognized banking
supervisory authorities of any place outside Hong Kong,
whenever appropriate, to the extent permitted by this
or any other Ordinance; and
(f) consider and propose reforms of the law relating to
banking business and the business of taking deposits.1
This is the first time the functions of the Commissioner is
1Banking Bill 1986, Clause 7, p. C135.
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clearly defined in banking statutes and it reflects the different
emphases in the approach to prudential supervision-- one that
relies more on the Commissioner's discretion and qualitative
judgement than previously.
A. Discretionary Power
Based on the painful experience gained from Hang Lung and
OTB events and in a move to prevent bank fraud and mismanagement,
the Banking Commissioner will be given additional discretionary
power under the Banking Bill.
At Part X of the Bill, the existing powers of the
Commissioner and Governor in Council over banks are extended to
deposit-taking companies. In addition, some other discretionary
powers are granted to the Commissioner. For example:
(i) Approval of exercising 10% or more acquired Voting
Power: Clause 70(1) of the Bill provides that, after
the commencement of the Bill, any person who
acquired, whether alone or in concert with others,
10% or more of the voting power at any general
meeting of a bank/DTC incorporated in Hong Kong shall
not exercise his voting power unless he has obtained
the Commissioner's approval to do so.
(ii) Approval of Controllers exercising their Power:
Clause 72(1) of the Bill provides that, after the
Bill comes into operation, no controller1 of a
1According to Clause 2 of Banking Bill 1986, "Controller"
means any person-
(a) in accordance with whose directions or instructions the
directors of the company or of another company of which it is
a subsidiary (or any of them) are accustomed to act or
(b) who is entitled to exercise, or control the exercise, of more
than 50 percent of the voting power at any general meeting of
the company or of another company of which it is a subsidiary.
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bank/DTC shall exercise his control of the
institution by giving any directions or instructions
to the directors of the institution unless he has the
Commissioner's approval to do so.
(iii) Approval of Appointment of Director or Secretary:
Clause 72(2) provides that after the commencement of
the Bill, the appointment of directors and company
secretaries of a bank or DTC will be subject to
consent in writing of the Commissioner.
On the whole, the ownership and management of any authorized
institution incorporated in Hong Kong will be more closely
monitored by the Banking Commissioner in order to reduce the risk
of mismanagement or fraudulent management which have been found in
recent events to be the root cause of bank failures.
As discussed in previous sections, the Commissioner will
also be empowered to vary the liquidity ratio for particular
authorized institutions, without upper limit, and to increase the
Capital to Risk Assets Ratio for particular banks with a ceiling of
not more than 8% and DTCs for not more than 10%. The device is to
enrich the Commissioner with flexibility to cope with situations
where he find a bank or a DTC is being run improperly.
B. Safeguards and Accountability
Safeguards against abuse of Commissioner's discretionary
powers are provided in the Banking Bill. Banks, DTCs or other
parties concerned have the right to appeal to the Financial
Secretary or the Governor in Council in the above mentioned cases
when the Commissioner is exercising his discretion. Also counter
balancing the Commissioner's expanded role are the reporting
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requirements at Clause 9 of the Bill.
The Commissioner is required to produce an annual report for
inspection to the Governor in Council on the working of the Banking
Ordiance and the activities of his office. In the report, the
Commissioner is required to draw attention to any breach or
avoidance of the ordinance that has come to his notice or any
irregularity discovered by him in the accounts and records of,any
authorized institution which he think is important.
The report will be published, in whole or in part, subject
to consent of the Governor in Council. Apart from the annual
report, the Governor has the power to request a report from the
Commissioner at any time.
Mr. Robert Fell, the Banking Commissioner, described the
annual report as an anchor of accountability. He said that though
the report cannot comment on individual banks under the nursery of
the Commission, it can explain how the Commissioner had dealt with
some publicised cases. And thereby the general guidelines and
criteria based on which the Commissioner had exercised his
discretionary powers would be shown.1
In order to satisfactorily implement his widened duties
under the Bill, it is estimated that the Commissioner's office will
require an additional 28 posts in 1986-87 and another 16 posts in
1987-88. The annual staff costs will thus be increased by $6.6
million in the first year of the Bill's operation and 10.1 million
2
in subsequent years.
1Cecilia Ko, "Assurance on Banking", South China Morning
Post, March 14, 1986.
2Banking Bill 1986, Explanatory Memorandum, p. C208.
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In fact, the wide discretionary powers we discussed above
have aroused great concern in the banking industry. Mr. Robert
Fell, Banking Commissioner, stressed that the Bill did not give any
great new accretion of powers instead, he said, The difference
now is that the Commissioner is being urged to use his powers and a
clear remit for action is being given.1
Even so, whether adequate safeguards have been provided in
the Banking Bill is still a controversial issue.
Restrictions on Lending
To avoid concentration of risks, existing legislation
prescribes limitations on total of advances, especially unsecured
ones, and other "non-banking" interests such as holding of share
capital of other companies and interests in lands. The Banking
Bill 1986 basically leaves all these limitations unchanged.
But the definition of company is modified. The existing
Banking Ordinance defines "company" as:
(a) incorporated under the Companies Ordinance; or
(b) incorporated by any other Ordinance; or
(c) which is incorporated outside Hong Kong and has
complied with the provisions of section 333 of the
Companies Ordinance. 2
The Banking Bill 1986, when defining the word company,
ceeps (a) and (b) above unchanged, but (c) was shortened to:
'Cecilia Ko, "Assurance on Banking", South China Morning
Post, March 14, 1986.
2Banking Ordinance, Part I, Section 2.
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(c) incorporated outside Hong Kong.
Since Section 333 of the Companies Ordinance refers to overseas
companies which establish a place of business in Hong Kong, the
simplified definition in the Bill will cover any overseas company
no matter it has established a place of business in Hong Kong or
not. By so doing, the loophole of lending to overseas company
without a place of business in Hong Kong to avoid the restriction
on lending is plugged.
Furthermore, two new clauses are introduced as follows:
(i) In addition to the existing restriction that a bank/DTC shall
not grant any advance, loan or credit facility against the
security of its own shares, Clause 80(2) of the Bill provides
that a bank/DTC shall not, except with the approval of the
Commissioner, grant any advance, loan or credit facility
against the security of the shares of its holding company or
any subsidiary of the institution itself or its holding
company.
(ii) Clause 82 of the Bill provides that the Commissioner may,
after consultation with the Financial Secretary, by notice in
the Gazette, issue directions applicable to all or a certain
class of authorized institutions requiring them not to engage
in a specific type of business practices which, in the
opinion of the Commissioner, will or may cause the soundness
of the financial position of authorized institutions to be
dependent upon the soundness of the financial position of a
single party.
The new restriction suggests that the Banking Commissioner
will take a more severe approach to prevent malpractice in
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lending. If we take into account the losses which banks and DTCs
have suffered due to the Carrian or similar events, it appears that
it is justified to be so.
Audits
Past events like Hang Lung Bank and Overseas Trust Bank
issues have suggested that bank's auditors should play a more
important role as a third party to monitor and discover
irregularities. Therefore, it is the intention of the Commissioner
to strengthen the relationship of Bank's auditors and himself by
establishing a form of contact that is known to and approved by the
client bank.
To achieve this objective, two new clauses are contained in
the Bill. Clause 61 provides that a tripartite meeting between the
governing board of an authorized institution, any auditor of the
institution, including any auditor who has acted for the
institution for any period not earlier than 9 months ago, and the
Commissioner to discuss matters relating to the institution. The
meeting can be requested by any of the above parties.
Clause 62 of the Bill empowers the Commissioner to refer to
the Disciplinary Committee of the Society of Accountants cases of
negligence or serious misconduct by any auditor of an authorized
institution.
Other audit requirements presently contained in the Banking
Ordinance is basically unchanged and is extended by the Banking
Bill to be applicable also to deposit-taking companies. By so
doing, the Commissioner is empowered to appoint a second auditor
for a deposit-taking company if it is found necessary.
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CHAPTER V
BANKERS' OPINIONS ON THE PROPOSED
REFORM AND ITS IMPLICATION
Opinions from banking officials of various banks and DTCS
have been collected through interviews on the following aspects:
On Discretionary Power of
the Commissioner
The widened power of the Banking Commissioner has aroused
great concern from bankers. Clause 70 and 72 of the Bill requires
that a controller has to apply for the Commissioner's approval
before exercising his voting power and giving directions or
instructions to the directors of the institution. A banker we
interviewed criticised that this is against the non-intervention
policy and free enterprise spirit which have long been adopted by
the Government and is one of the major causes of the success of
Hong Kong as an international financial centre. Besides, on what
basis can the Commissioner decide whether a person should be
Annrnve to exercise his voting power.
The requirement that appointment of director or secretary of
an authorized institution shall be subject to consent of the
Commissioner is also criticised by the banker. Though it was
discovered that the failures of Hang Lung Bank and OTB were due to
misconduct of directors, the requirement may not be an effective
measure to prevent similar events from happening again. Rather,
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the banker suggested, improvement of the quality of the
Commissioner's supervision and audits of banks' auditors is more
important.
Though safeguards have been introduced in the Banking Bill,
some benkers still expressed their concern on abuse of the
Commissioner's power, and above all, the quality of his staff to
make efficient use of the powers.
On Liquidity Ratio
Some bankers expected that the Hong Kong capital market will
benefit from the new liquidity requirement since more kinds of
securities such as notes and commercial papers are included in the
Bill to be treated as liquefiable assets. Banks and DTCs will
certainly be encouraged by the new requirement to purchase and hold
more securities in their portfolio and thereby foster the growth of
the capital market.
Another banker told us that he expected there might be a
change of practice in granting loan form banks. More loans will be
structured and documented on a short term basis with the
understanding that renewal will normally be granted upon maturity
so as those loans can be treated as liquefiable assets.
Though the loophole of creating artificial "Specified Liquid
Assets" by roundtripping as discussed in previous chapter can be
prevented in the new requirement, a banker we interviewed pointed
out that banks or DTCs can still create artifical liquefiable
assets by lending to their overseas branch money with maturity of
less than one month while borrowing back from the branch same
amount of funds with maturity longer than one month. Although a
maturity gap may be created and loss of interest may occur due to
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positive yield curve, it will be quite easy for the bank to get
back compensation from its branch in some other way. For example,
by making up two foreign exchange transactions with the same branch
with the design that the bank buys low and sells high, the bank can
easily earn back the loss. Of course, the banker pointed out, it
could be possible for banks, especially foreign banks with several
branches in various financial centres, to create artificial
liquefiable assets in a more disguised way.
Another opinion from an accountant of a bank is that under
the existing legislation, the liquidity ratio is calculated every
Wednesday, but the Banking Bill requires that the new liquidity
ratio shall be calculated daily. According to the accountant, this
will increase the operation cost of a bank substantially. We were
told that this opinion has been passed to the Commissioner and it
is being considered whether amendment will be made.
On Risk Assets Ratio
The ratio will only be imposed on locally incorporated
institutions. An official from a local bank claimed that the
measurement would put local banks and DTCs into a more difficult
position to compete with foreign banks. "For Japanese banks and
most of the PRC banks, "he said, "there is not any similiar
requirement for them to follow in their home countries and they
will be in a much better position to compete with us."
Another issue concerning the Risk Assets Ratio was the Risk
Weight assigned to the interbank claims on registered DTCs.
Originally, it was proposed that a Risk Weight of 1.0 should be
assigned to claims on registered DTCs. Due to strong objection
from registered DTCs, it was eventually assigned a Risk Weight of
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0.5. We were told by some bankers that the Hong Kong
Deposit-taking Companies Association is trying to persuade the
Government to assign a Risk Weight of 0.2 to those bank-related
registered DTCs. A banker we interviewed told us that if the
present proposal in the Bill remained unchanged, it would be more
difficult for registered DTCs to borrow money from interbank market
since for claims on banks and licensed DTCs the Risk Weight is only
0.2. Eventually, registered DTCs may have to pay premium above
market interest rate.
On Restrictions on Lending
Clause 82 is controversial. It provides that the
Commissioner may by notice in the Gazette, issue directions to
Banks/DTCs not to engage in certain business practices which the
Commissioner is of the opinion that it may cause the soundness of
the financial psoition of authorized institutions to be dependent
upon the soundness of the financial position of a single party.
The purpose of this clause is clearly to avoid concentration
of risks. However, a banker cautioned that if the Commissioner
issues such kind of directions in the Gazette, the image of the
banking industry as well as the single party concerned may be
seriously affected. It may be especially unfair for the single
party affected as it may not be able to raise funds again locally.
some institutions are upset by the wording "directions" and it is
said that the Commissioner is considering replacing it with term
like "guidelines" in future.
On Audits
It appears that both the banking community and accounting
professionals welcome the idea of triparitite meetings and the
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power endowed to the Commissioner to refer to the Disciplinary
Committee of the Society of Accountants in case of negligence or
serious misconduct by any auditor of an authorized institution.
All agreed that quality of bank auditing should be improved and
co-operation between banks' auditors and the Commissioner should be
strengthened so as to help improving supervision on authorized
institutions.
Generally speaking, it appears to us that the principles
behind the proposed banking reform are accepted by the banking
industry though some refinement of the Bill are suggested. All of
the bankers we interviewed agreed that a stricter supervision on
banks and DTCs are necessary in order to strengthen the banking and
financial systems as well as enhancing Hong Kong's status as an
international financial centre. In fact, more than one bankers
pointed out that Hong Kong is now facing the challenge not only
from Singapore but also from Tokyo as Tokyo market is now being
opened and Japanese Yen is undergoing the process of
internationalization. It is, therefore, crucial for Hong Kong to
reform its banking industry to bring itself to a healthier
condition.
With regard to other issues which have been raised and
discussed but eventually excluded in the Bill, such as Deposit
Insurance, establishment of discount window, lender of last resort
and disclosure of banks' inner reserves, bankers' opinions seems to
be quite divided. However, the suggestion to create a special
category of bank, the limited service bank, seems to be welcomed by
the majority. Due to limitation of time and resources, these




The failures of banks in Hong Kong since 1983 have exposed
weak banking supervision and incompetent or imprudent management of
banks. The proposed banking reform is specially devised to
minimize the risk of future banking failures and to strengthen the
banking system as well as to enhance Hong Kong's status as an
international financial centre.
We agree with the general principles behind the Bill that
supervisory approach should be shifted from a purely rule-based to
a more flexible and discretionary base. Nevertheless, we share the
views of many bankers and are a bit worried that the widened power
endowed to the Commissioner may be abused. As pointed out by some
bankers, legislation is one thing and the capability of the
authorities to detect irregularities and to diagnose whether a bank
is in difficulty is another.
As discussed in previous chapters, some loopholes under the
existing legislation have been plugged by the Banking Bill.
However, some other loopholes will emerge as circumstances change.
In reality, people are always wise enough to get round even the
tightest rules and law enforcers are forced to play the
never-ending game of plugging new loopholes. Therefore, it is more
important to continue upgrading the quality of supervision rather
than changing the legislation. We strongly recommend that major
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effort should be made to improve the quality of the Banking
Commissioner office.
Based on our study of the Banking Bill and opinions
collected from various bankers, we would like to elaborate our
viewpoints on the following aspects:
On Capital to Risk Assets Ratio
We are of the opinion that the Capital to Risk Assets Ratio
introduced in the Bill is an effective measure to restrict banks
and DTCs from overlending. Although some definitions need to be
further clarified, the formula for calculation suggested in Fourth
Schedule of the Bill is basically acceptable.
We support the proposal of creating a new category of
limited service banking for those institutions doing offshore
banking business. As they are supposed to be restricted from
taking deposits from the public, it is reasonable that they should
be allowed to maintain a lower percentage of Risk Assets Ratio. As
Hong Kong is now facing fierce competition from Tokyo, Singapore as
well as Sydney as the No. 1 financial centre in Asia, we recommend
that Government should seriously consider this suggestion. We
estimate that at least 30 DTCs will be qualified to be classified
in the new category and more foreign institutions will be lured to
open their offshore banking arms here, given the low taxation in
Hong Kong.
Regarding the suggestion that those bank-related registered
DTCs should be assigned a Risk Weight of 0.2 instead of 0.5, we are
of the opinion that as registered DTCs are smaller in size in terms
of capital, and as those bank-related DTCs can easily get their
funds from their parent companies, it is not necessary to assign to
53
them a lower risk weight identical with that of licensed banks and
licensed DTCs.
On Liquidity Ratio
We are of the opinion that the new liquidity requirement is
basically an improvement of the existing requirement, though banks
can still create artificial liquefiable assets by borrowing long
while lending short, as discussed in previous chapter.
The Bill requires that the liquidity ratio shall be
calculated on the basis of the average of the daily liquidity
ratio. We share the view of some bankers that it may greatly
increase the operation cost of authorized institutions and suggest
that it should be the average of the liquidity ratio of each
Wednesday as required by the existing legislation. However, the
Commissioner shall be enpowered to require a particular institution
to calculate the ratio daily if it is deemed necessary.
On Discretionary Power of the Commissioner
We share the view of some bankers that the Bill has given
too wide discretionary power to the Commissioner. The provisions
that controller shall not exercise his acquired voting power
without the Commissioner's approval and that the appointment of a
director or secretary of an authorized institution shall be subject
to the Commissioner's consent are apparently intended to upgrade
the quality of ownership and management of authorized
institutions. Though past events like Hang Lung and OTB show that
misconduct of management was crucial to bank failures, the
provisions are not necessarily effective devices as it will be
quite difficult for the Commissioner to set up an objective
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criterion to decide who should be approved to exercise his voting
power and who should be allowed to be appointed as a director or
secretary of an authorized institution. On the contrary, it may
increase the workload of the Commissioner and it is against the
non-intervention policy of the Government.
We recommend that both of the above provisions should be
abolished.
On Restrictions on Lending
Clause 82 of the Bill provides that the Commissioner may, by
notice in the Gazette, issue directions to authorized institutions
not to engage in business practices which, in the opinion of the
Commissioner, will or may cause the soundness of the financial
position of authorized institutions to be dependent upon the
soundness of the financial position of a single party. We share
the views of many bankers that the provision may result in an
unnecessary intervention in the development of the banking
industry. We suggest that this clause should be abolished and
moral suasion should be used by the Commissioner when it is
necessary.
Generally speaking, we think that the Banking Bill is
basically an improvement of the present legislation. The proposed
amendments are, by and large, proper, valid and justified. We
trust that upon enactment of the Bill, the banking industry will be
better supervised and the interests of depositors better protected,
though need for possible changes in some of the areas are still
pressing.
However, the major implication of the Bill would be that
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smaller local banks will be in a more difficult position to compete
with foreign institutions. Given the fact that six local banks
have already run into troubles and have to be bailed out in one way
or another, there will be no surprise that more smaller local banks
will be acquired by so-called Big Daddy or merge with each other
in order to survive. A restructuring in the banking sector appears
to be inevitable and we earnestly hope that Hong Kong will further
develop into a more sophisticated international financial centre.
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